Recently, Romy Vekony, Alfred Mele, and David Rose published “Intentional Action without Knowledge” in Synthese. Here’s a link. Matt King disagrees with them. » …Read more
Category: Action Theory (Philosophy of Action)
What fundamentally exemplifies the property of practical rationality?
- According to atomism, it is fundamentally each particular intention that an agent might have at a time that counts as either rational or irrational for the agent to have at that time.
This is a call for abstracts for the fifth biennial New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR 5), to be held in New Orleans, » …Read more
Istvan Zardai (Keio University) has been conducting and posting some very cool “mini-interviews” with leading philosophers of action over the past year, on the site Philosophy of Action. » …Read more
I’ll try to keep this brief, and so will likely run roughshod over important points. I’m curious about what’s doing the work on our intuitions in so-called manipulation cases when people deploy them to theorize about responsibility. » …Read more
The program for the 4th biennial New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR 4) has been set. It is pasted below the fold. The workshop takes place in New Orleans on November 2-4, » …Read more
I have a roughly formulated and half-baked inquiry:
Suppose that rationality endorses maximizing utility, but there is room for rational supererogation, and so it is sometimes rationally permissible to drink a coffee even if doing so does not maximize utility. » …Read more
There has come to be some consensus amongst political scientists and legal theorists that a major source of over-incarceration in the United States is (mostly county) prosecutors filing a significantly increased number of charges against individual arrestees (e.g., » …Read more